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Abstract 
How has the securitisation of development affected the distribution of bilateral 
development aid by sector?  Over the past two decades, academics and development NGOs have 
become increasingly concerned about the impact of the securitisation of development. This debate 
has not, however, adequately addressed the impact of securitisation on actual aid commitments to 
key sectors. If aid commitments are influenced by securitisation this will have implications for the 
types of programmes funded by bilateral donors. This article examines whether and how 
securitisation has affected the distribution of UK, US, Danish and Swedish development aid by sector 
through investigating how conflict in aid-recipient states and the extent to which these states are 
perceived as a security threat, affect aid commitments to priority sectors; democratisation and 
peace, conflict and security. A mixed-methods approach analyses the policy discourse and aid 
commitments of the four bilateral donors. For the latter we use data from the OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme, along with data from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute and the Global Terrorism Database in a cross-sectional time-series regression analysis. The 
new data produced indicate that the securitisation of development has had the most significant 
effect on aid commitments to states not affected by conflict and that the strategic importance of 
conflict-affected states and the domestic character of donor governments both influence the 
strength of aid securitisation. Given the concerns regarding aid for security purposes and donors’ 
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policy discourse, bilateral donors should consider the need of current funding for conflict, peace and 
security programmes in states not affected by conflict and recognise the role of national security 
interests in decisions about the distribution of aid.  
 
Keywords: security–development nexus; development aid; securitisation; conflict; post-conflict 
states; donor interest; democratisation; sector aid provision.  
 
Introduction 
Over the past 20 years, academics and development NGOs have become increasingly 
concerned that international development has become securitised (Duffield, 2001; Oxfam GB, 2011; 
McConnon, 2014; Brown & Gravingholt, 2016a). Within this literature, ‘securitisation of 
development’ is understood to mean that development agencies conceive of conflict and instability 
in the Global South as an international security threat. However, although the securitisation of 
development in the policy discourse has received substantial attention (Wilkin, 2002; Duffield, 2007; 
McConnon, 2014), how securitisation affects actual aid commitments remains understudied. In 
response, this article examines whether and how securitisation has influenced the distribution of UK, 
US, Swedish and Danish development aid by sector. 
Using a mixed-methods analysis of data between 1995 and 2015,3 we find a tension 
between donors’ policy discourse that emphasises the need to invest in democratisation and 
conflict, peace, and security activities as key pillars of peacebuilding in conflict-affected states, and 
donors’ actual aid commitments. Using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Uppsala University Conflict Data 
Programme, we find that while donors have indeed increased aid to these sectors over the past two 
decades, the increases have not focused on conflict-affected states. Rather, donors have augmented 
aid commitments to conflict, peace and security activities mainly in states not affected by conflict. 
However, using data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Global Terrorism Database, we 
find that in some cases, bilateral aid commitments to conflict-affected states of high strategic 
interest to the donors are more likely to reflect the securitisation of development in the donors’ 
policy discourse. For example, under recent Conservative governments in the UK, conflict-affected 
states of higher strategic interest have been prioritised in the allocation of development aid to 
democratisation and conflict, peace, and security activities.  
                                                          
3The period 1995-2015 was chosen as quantitative aid data broken down by sectors before 1995 or after 2015 
were not available at the time of research. The development policy discourse indicates that development began to 
be linked with security priorities towards the end of the 1990s. 
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As well as demonstrating disparity between donors’ policy discourse and actual aid 
commitments, our findings make two further important contributions to understanding the impact 
of securitisation on aid flows. First, they suggest that the securitisation of development has had the 
most significant effect on aid to states not affected by conflict. Second, they illustrate that both the 
strategic importance of conflict-affected states and the domestic character of donor governments 
influence the strength of aid securitisation. 
 
Securitisation of development 
The securitisation of development per se is not new; during the Cold War, development and 
security concerns were indivisible, such that security concerns largely dictated development policy. 
After a brief period in which security concerns were delinked from development, including a 
reluctance by donors to engage in conflict zones (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2006, p. 340), the mid-1990s 
saw a resurgence of securitisation, but with two distinctions from the Cold War security–
development nexus. First, there were two possible development paths during the Cold War and 
second, the enemy of national security was identified as capitalism or communism, with aid used for 
strategic purposes to contain one or the other. In the current manifestation of securitisation, conflict 
and instability in the Global South are perceived as a threat to the national security of Western 
donors and the only development path is that of liberal democracy (Thomas, 2001; Wilkin, 2002; 
Cliffe et al., 2003; Beall et al., 2005; Wilkinson, 2005; Woods, 2005; Duffield, 2010; Hettne, 2010; 
McConnon, 2014). Although securitisation as conceptualised by these authors owes a debt to the 
Copenhagen School’s original understanding of securitisation,4 the latter argues for a legitimate 
widening of the traditional security framework to include, for example, economic or societal 
security, whereas the debate surrounding the securitisation of development tends to problematise 
underdevelopment as a security concern for Western states. 
The security–development nexus is perceived within this literature to have had an effect 
upon the distribution of development aid. For instance, McConnon argues that the ‘shift in 
discourse’ has coincided with the ‘prioritisation of fragile states in aid flows’ and ‘specific 
                                                          
4 First, the securitisation of development is a act of political will and a speech act in that it has survived the merging 
of the orthodox security and development discourses (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 26; Wilkin, 2002). Second, Buzan 
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programmes aimed at addressing [donor] security concerns’ (2014, p. 1146; also Duffield, 2007, p. 
126). Similarly, Brown and Gravingholt claim that ‘international aid agencies have revised their aid 
strategies to reflect new security concerns and increased aid to strategic conflict-affected countries’ 
(2016b, pp. 1-2; also Woods, 2005, p. 393; Beall et al., 2006, p. 55; Petrikova & Lazell, 2017). 
Development NGOs express similar concerns. Oxfam GB (2011, pp. 1-2) argues that in Europe and 
North America donors’ ‘military and security interests have skewed global aid spending’, while 
Saferworld is concerned that donors’ security interests may overshadow the wellbeing of vulnerable 
populations, particularly in fragile states (2011, p. 2). 
The securitisation of development aid differs from earlier manifestations of donor self-
interest in providing aid. Existing literature has linked donor aid commitments to bilateral trade 
(Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009), favourable votes at the UN (Alesina & Dollar, 2000), Security 
Council seats (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006), and geographic proximity (Neumayer, 2005). In contrast, 
this article investigates how the securitisation of development – the idea that conflict and fragility in 
the Global South pose a threat to donors – has affected aid commitments. Specifically, we look at 
how securitisation has affected the type of programmes funded by aid. Unlike some previous 
studies, we do not examine specific donor–recipient relationships in a qualitative manner (as, for 
example, Brown and Gravingholt, 2016b) but, move beyond the existing literature to undertake a 
systematic quantitative cross-country investigation of aid to all recipients from four major Western 
donors: the UK, the US, Denmark, and Sweden. 
These countries represent a range of OECD donors with varying security and development 
capabilities and concerns. The US and UK were chosen to represent large donors who, as key 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), have significant international security 
commitments (Petrikova, 2016). Denmark is also a NATO member but with a much smaller 
commitment, both in terms of international security and the size of its aid programme. Sweden is 
not part of NATO and, along with Denmark, has a strong tradition of altruism in its commitment to 
international development (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Because the security and development 
commitments of the four donors vary substantially, our results shed light not only on the extent to 
which securitisation has influenced aid commitments, but also on whether it has affected donors in a 
similar way irrespective of their positions regarding NATO or international development traditions.5 
                                                          
5It is beyond the scope of this article to capture all possible representations of the securitisation of development; 
we could say, for example, that aid has been securitised when it is delivered by the military, or aligned with 
specific military objectives (as was the case in Afghanistan). Our purpose here, rather, is to further the 
understanding of the link between securitisation of development discourse and provision of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), recognising that there may be other manifestations that also require further research. 
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The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we examine the development 
policy discourse of the four selected bilateral donors to establish how we may expect the 
securitisation of development to influence aid commitments. Based on the results of this analysis, in 
the second section we construct several testable hypotheses. Following this we introduce the 
article’s theoretical framework, the data used and the empirical methods employed to analyse them. 
The final sections present our findings and discuss their policy and political implications. 
 
Development policy discourse 
What does the policy discourse suggest about the type of programmes that should be 
funded to strengthen the donors’ national security? In order to answer this question, and thus 
construct our hypotheses, we identified the types of aid programmes highlighted by donors in their 
policy discourse as key to reducing conflict and building peaceful societies. This identification 
involved a systematic collection and analysis of development policy documents from our four donors 
over the last two decades. Major policy documents including government white papers and reports, 
speeches by international development ministers setting out overarching development strategies, 
and policy documents specifically dealing with conflict, security, and development were analysed. A 
complete list of these documents is included in the Appendix. Using qualitative-analysis software an 
iterative process of analysis was used with text coded to categories and patterns identified (Tracy, 
2012).  
Given the research question specified above, primary-cycle coding involved coding 
references to security, conflict/instability, and fragile states, as well as to refugee movements and 
terrorism etc., to ascertain how these concepts were understood in the discourse. Secondary-cycle 
coding aimed to identify patterns and links between these concepts – for example, how ‘fragile 
states’ are understood in relation to ‘global security’. Secondary-cycle coding also sought to establish 
the types of programmes deemed appropriate in conflict-affected and post-conflict states. This 
eventually led to hierarchical coding of programmes where various codes were placed under 
umbrella categories to make sense of them. The results of this qualitative analysis are as follows.  
Within the discourse of three of our selected bilateral donors, the securitisation of 
development is well-established and dates from the early 2000s. It broadly involves three related 
beliefs. The first is that underdevelopment and conflict in the Global South are mutually reinforcing 
(Danida, 2005, p. 17; DFID, 2005a, p. 3; 2005b, pp. 5-8; HM Treasury and DFID, 2015, pp. 3-5; 2012, 
p. 2; Greening, 2015a, pp. 7-8; 2015b, p. 2; USAID, 2013, pp. 8 & 29; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Sweden, 2016a, p. 7). All four donors agree on this point. 
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The second assumption is that instability and conflict in the Global South are sources of 
international insecurity (Danida, 2005, p. 9; DFID, 2005a, pp. 3-5; 2012, p. 2; USAID, 2005, p. v; 2011, 
p. 1; 2013, p. 30; Greening, 2015a, pp. 7-8; 2015b, p. 2). While strongly emphasised in DFID and 
USAID policy documents, this belief has been toned down in the most recent Danida (Denmark’s 
Development Cooperation department) policy document (compare, for example, Danida, 2003 with 
The Danish Government, 2015). Unlike the other three donors, Swedish development discourse 
emphasises only the moral responsibility to support the poor and oppressed (Ohlsson 2000, p. 1; 
Persson & Karlson, 2003; Soder, 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2016a; 2016b, p. 9) and 
does not explicitly link these goals with Sweden’s national security interests. 
Supported by these first two ideas, the third assumption is that development aid can be 
used to enhance the donor’s national security (i.e. the securitisation of development aid) (Danida, 
2003, p. 2; DFID, 2010; USAID, 2011: Forward from the Administrator; USAID, 2013, i; HM Treasury & 
DFID, 2015, p. 3). Unsurprisingly, given their raison d’être, the agencies explicitly depict aid as a 
powerful tool which can reduce and prevent future conflict in the Global South. For DFID and USAID, 
the rationale for this is explicitly national security. As mentioned, a similar rationale is more 
prevalent in earlier Danish policy documents than in more recent ones, and is absent from Swedish 
development policy discourse. 
According to the policy discourse of all four donors, reducing and preventing future conflict 
in the Global South requires two types of development interventions. The first seeks to encourage 
the development of democratic, inclusive societies, which respect human rights (Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, 2003; USAID, 2013, pp. 4, 9). Such programmes are ‘critical to the U.S national interest’ (ibid: 
4) as they support efforts to combat terrorism and extremism (ibid: 9). Interventions promoting this 
‘golden thread of democracy’ (HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, p. 11; see also Danida, 2012; USAID, 2013) 
include strengthening civil society and the rule of law, tackling marginalisation and exclusion, and 
advancing the rights and opportunities of women and girls (USAID, 2002, p. 106; 2013, p. 5; 
Greening, 2015b). According to USAID, these measures ‘may be among the most important 
contributions that foreign assistance can make to conflict management and mitigation’ (USAID, 
2002, p. 106; see also USAID, 2013, p. 11). 
The second type of development programmes that can contribute to the donors’ national 
security are explicit conflict-prevention and resolution measures. These include the disarmament of 
civilians, reform of the security, police and justice sectors, and civilian ‘peace-building’ activities 
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(DFID, 2003; Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003, p. 30; USAID, 2013, i; The Danish Government, 2015, 
pp. 1-5).6 
In summary, the DFID and USAID policy documents strongly reflect the securitisation of 
development, i.e. the belief that development aid can and should be used in the national security 
interest of donors, underpinned by the assumption that conflict and instability in the Global South 
have the potential to undermine their security. This belief is less prevalent in more recent Danish 
policy documents and does not form a part of the Swedish discourse. All four donors, however, 
advocate the view that development aid can mitigate conflict and insecurity in the Global South 
through democratisation programmes and explicit conflict-prevention measures. For the UK, US, and 
Denmark, such development interventions are believed to directly contribute to their national 
security objectives. 
Conflict and instability are understood to underpin activities, such as terrorism and 
transnational crime, that can threaten donors’ national security and therefore the conflict status of 
states is key when assessing the levels of aid securitisation. However, we also recognise that within 
the pool of conflict-affected states some will be perceived as posing a potentially greater security 
threat than others. This is where our ‘strategic interest’ variable, explained below, comes in. 
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
In order to assess the extent to which development practice reflects the policy discourse, we 
investigate whether the sectors donors identify as crucial to restoring peace and stability – aid to 
democratisation (hypothesis 1[H1]) and aid to conflict, peace, security (CPS) activities (hypothesis 
2[H2]) – have been prioritised in aid commitments to conflict-affected states and whether this 
increased over time. As a second step in the analysis, in acknowledgment that some conflict-affected 
states are viewed as more strategically important to donors than others, we examine whether 
conflict-affected states that are of a higher security interest for the donor are prioritised in the 
allocation of democratisation (hypothesis 3[H3]) and conflict, peace, and security aid (hypothesis 
4[H4]). 
In order to provide a robust analysis, we use several methods to examine the extent to 
which aid commitments reflect policy discourse in prioritising democratisation and conflict, peace, 
and security activities in conflict-affected countries (H1 and H2). We look at trends in the provision 
of aid, both as volume per capita and as a proportion of all aid committed to the key sectors, first 
                                                          
6 Providing development aid to sectors other than democratisation and conflict prevention, such to health (Calain 
& Sa’Da, 2015) or education (Howell & Lind, 2009), has occasionally also been depicted by donors as 
strengthening their national security. However, the emphasis on the importance of conflict-prevention and 
democratisation aid to sustainable peace has been significantly more consistent, which is why we focus on those 
particular types of aid.  
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among all aid recipients and second among conflict-affected states only. Positive results for conflict-
affected states would be suggestive of the securitisation of development aid. 
In addition, we investigate the extent to which conflict affects how much democratisation 
and CPS aid states receive from donors, in per-capita as well as proportional terms, and how this has 
changed over time. We expect that conflict-affected countries receive more conflict, peace, and 
security aid than countries not affected by conflict and are interested here in whether this trend has 
increased more rapidly in conflict-affected states compared to peaceful states. A more rapid 
increase in democratisation aid to conflict-affected countries may also indicate that development aid 
has been securitised. 
Assessing empirically whether donors favour conflict-affected states which are of higher 
strategic interest to them in allocating democratisation and CPS aid (H3 and H4) is methodologically 
more straightforward. Here, we analyse the impact of the donors’ strategic interests on their aid 
commitments in the key sectors in conflict-affected countries and the impacts’ evolution over the 
past two decades.  
We do not construct a formal hypothesis regarding any differences between the four donors 
but in view of their distinct policy discourse, we expect to find Swedish aid, and Danish aid in more 
recent years, to be less ‘securitised’ than that provided by the US and the UK, particularly with 
regard to the influence of donors’ strategic interests. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
Dependent variable 
In testing hypotheses related to the provision of democratisation aid (H1 and H3), the 
dependent variable is alternatively a) the per-capita volume of aid in 2014 US dollars and b) the 
proportion of all aid committed to democratisation activities, classified by the CRS of the OECD aid 
database under the code 152: I.5.a. These activities include support to democratic participation and 
civil society, legal and judicial development, legislatures and political parties, elections, anti-
corruption, human rights, women’s rights, and free media. 
When testing hypotheses related to CPS aid (H2 and H4), the dependent variable is either 
the per-capita volume of aid, in 2014 US dollars, or the proportion of all aid committed to recipients’ 
conflict, peace, and security activities (CRS code 152: I.5.b). The category includes aid for security-
system management and reform; civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and resolution; 
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participation in international peacekeeping operations; reintegration and small-arms and light-
weapons control; removal of landmines; and work with child soldiers.7 
We examine aid commitments rather than disbursements, for two reasons. First, OECD data 
on aid disbursements to different sectors are unreliable and available only after 2002 (Petrikova, 
2016). Second, aid commitments are subject to fewer arbitrary executive decisions and are less 
influenced by recipients’ administrative capacity than aid disbursements. Consequently, they reflect 
donors’ intentions more closely than disbursements (Berthelemy, 2006). 
 
Main independent variables 
The focus of the donor development discourse, reviewed earlier, is fragile and conflict-
affected states. Within this category, some states are strategically more important to donors that 
others. The main independent variables in the empirical analysis are hence ‘conflict status’ and 
‘strategic interest’.  
A state’s conflict status is approximated via two distinct measures. The first is conflict 
intensity from the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), which rates countries from 0 
(no conflict) to 2 (high conflict intensity). The second variable, post-conflict,8 is a binary variable of 
our own design, where countries are considered to be post-conflict for five years following a descent 
from 2 to 1 and three years following a descent from 1 to 0 on the UCDP conflict-intensity scale. The 
two separate variables are in some empirical tests combined into a binary variable called conflict 
status, which takes a value of 1 for any country in conflict or post-conflict.9  
The ‘strategic interest’ of each recipient state for the donor is operationalised using a 
variable composed of the number of refugees a donor received from the recipient country in one 
year, the number of arms exported by that donor to the recipient country in that year, and the 
number of casualties from terrorist attacks against citizens of OECD/EU member states in the 
recipient country that year. Data on refugees were obtained from the UNHCR database, data on 
arms transfers from SIPRI and data on terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database. The 
                                                          
7 The democratisation activities together with the conflict, peace, and security activities constitute the government and civil 
society sector of aid provision within the CRS database. 
8 The post-conflict variable is included because donors understand the post-conflict phase as a crucial time for 
peacebuilding activities and strengthening recipients’ governance. This could be because countries in active 
conflict may lack the capacity necessary to use development aid properly and because providing aid in conflict 
situations may require donors to take political decisions about which side of the conflict to support. 
9 Initially, we used two further measures – the number of conflict-related deaths per country per year (available 
from UCDP) and the Fragile States Index rating compiled by the Fund for Peace since 2006. In the final models, 
we decided against using the number-of-deaths variable due to its consistently similar but slightly less significant 
results than those obtained with the conflict-intensity measure. We chose not to use the Fragile States Index 
because it was not available before 2006, which severely limited our sample. 
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three data components were first standardised to 0-1000 values, summed, and finally re-coded into 
a 0-3 scale, with 0 signifying low and 3 high strategic interest for the donor. 
These three components were chosen based on what donors identify as national security 
threats that can be mitigated through development aid as well as on their less explicit geo-political 
interests. Both migration and terrorism have been identified as the key global challenges in the 
development policy discourse of the UK, US, and Denmark as well as in the UK’s latest strategic 
defence and security review (HM Government, 2015). In addition, arms exports have been 
commonly used in aid literature as the best approximation of donors’ geopolitical strategic interests 
(Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Neumayer, 2003b). 
 
Control variables 
Following existing literature on aid allocation (e.g. Neumayer, 2003a; Nielsen, 2013; 
Petrikova, 2016), our model controls for recipient needs and donor interests other than security. 
Keeping in mind our overall focus on aid committed to government and civil society (conflict, peace, 
and security and democratisation aid fall under this remit) rather than total aid flows more 
commonly analysed by researchers, the most obvious recipient need is to address poor governance, 
since countries with poor governance can in theory benefit more from donor investments in their 
government and civil society sectors (Winters & Martinez, 2015). We operationalise governance 
through the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). We also control for GDP per 
capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, and population size, both obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Turning to donor interests other than security, trade flows with recipients may influence 
donors’ decisions regarding the proportion of aid committed to activities under the government and 
civil society sector – such investments could be seen as an incentive or reward to important trading 
partners. Therefore, we include a measure of bilateral export and import flows with each donor, 
obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. We also control for former colonial relations. 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables are displayed in Table 6 in the Appendix. 
 
Dataset and empirical methods 
The dataset used in this study covers 145 aid recipient countries for 21 years (1995–2015), 
which constitute the time span for which sector-aid data were available at the time of writing. In 
order to account for bureaucratic inertia in aid provision, as well as the reality of aid committed to 
projects and programmes for several years in advance, the data are not analysed annually but 
averaged over seven three-year periods. As a robustness test, however, we also examine the 
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relationship between conflict-affected states and aid to democratisation and to conflict, peace, and 
security activities using two-year and four-year averaged data. Unlike annual data, the averaged data 
according to the Arellano-Bond (1991) tests are not serially correlated. 
The selection of the appropriate empirical estimator is hence driven primarily by the 
censored nature of the data: they are downward-censored by 0, i.e. cannot take negative values (the 
proportional measures of aid are also upward-censored by 1). Accordingly, we use panel Tobit 
regressions with random dyad effects (discussed in more detail by, for instance, Nielsen, 2013). All 
the regression models were estimated using robust standard errors. 
 
Summary statistics 
Table 1 displays trends in the main dependent and independent variables for the first and 
last time periods examined. Of the four donors, only Denmark did not commit on average more total 
aid per recipient country in 2013-2015 than in 1995-1997. The UK and the US more than doubled 
their average contributions per recipient. All four donors increased their per-capita and relative aid 
commitments to conflict, peace, and security activities and, with the exception of the US in relative 
and the UK in per-capita terms, to democratisation. This has translated into an overall increase in the 
proportion of Danish, Swedish, and UK aid flows to recipients’ government and civil society sector 
(combination of democratisation and CPS aid) between 1995-1997 and 2013-2015; meanwhile, the 
proportion of US aid to this sector decreased considerably (see Figure 1). 
 






Regarding the key independent variables, the average conflict intensity declined over the 
two decades examined, from 0.26 to 0.18, while the proportion of post-conflict countries increased, 
from 7 to 16 per cent. Figure 2 displays the temporal evolution of the four donors’ proportional aid 
commitments to conflict-affected countries and demonstrates that while Danish and Swedish 
contributions rose over time, US and UK contributions decreased. Nevertheless, the UK still 
committed proportionally most aid to conflict-affected countries in 2013-2015 and, in line with the 
UK’s current strategy to allocate more than half of DFID’s annual budget to fragile countries (DFID, 
2015), this figure is now likely to be even higher. 
 




Turning to the strategic interest variable, in the first time period, the average aid recipient 
held the most strategic interest for Sweden, followed by the US, the UK, and Denmark. By 2013-





Table 1. Summary statistics of the dependent and key independent variables 
 
 
Summary statistics of the control variables, shown in Table 6 in the Appendix, demonstrate 
that aid recipients’ GDP per capita along with donors’ exports to and imports from aid-recipient 
countries on average increased in the two decades under observation. However, there has been 
little improvement in governance indicators. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK 16.50 46.34 0.00 451.82 34.99 105.02 0.00 1054.40 
US 63.06 218.72 0.02 1736.69 151.03 285.51 0.02 2341.88 
Denmark 16.46 22.47 0.00 94.07 13.88 26.64 0.00 173.59 
Sweden 8.75 15.26 0.01 84.31 11.48 19.95 0.01 98.72 
UK 0.001 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.080 0.26 0.00 1.83 
US 0.047 0.25 0.00 1.88 0.230 0.66 0.00 4.54 
Denmark 0.008 0.04 0.00 0.26 0.029 0.10 0.00 0.55 
Sweden 0.019 0.12 0.00 1.10 0.048 0.23 0.00 2.32 
UK 0.547 5.58 0.00 20.00 0.191 0.55 0.00 5.36 
US 1.131 2.33 0.00 16.24 4.155 23.94 0.00 268.15 
Denmark 0.154 0.59 0.00 4.43 0.248 0.80 0.00 6.39 
Sweden 0.271 0.74 0.00 4.65 0.350 0.76 0.00 4.59 
UK 0.001 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.034 0.08 0.00 0.43 
US 0.007 0.03 0.00 0.28 0.021 0.05 0.00 0.37 
Denmark 0.016 0.09 0.00 0.72 0.039 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Sweden 0.012 0.05 0.00 0.34 0.028 0.09 0.00 0.62 
UK 0.090 0.15 0.00 0.60 0.117 0.17 0.00 1.00 
US 0.244 0.26 0.00 0.97 0.202 0.25 0.00 0.99 
Denmark 0.113 0.20 0.00 0.81 0.383 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Sweden 0.325 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.370 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Conflict intensity 0.26 0.49 0.00 2.00 0.18 0.44 0.00 2.00 
Post-conflict 0.07 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.34 0.00 1.00 
UK 1.43 1.28 0.00 3.00 1.56 1.13 0.00 3.00 
US 1.55 1.20 0.00 3.00 1.49 1.04 0.00 3.00 
Denmark 1.23 1.11 0.00 3.00 0.73 1.01 0.00 3.00 
Sweden 1.64 1.26 0.00 3.00 1.33 1.20 0.00 3.00 
No. of countries 
Wave1: 1995-1997 Wave 6: 2013-2015 
Total aid per recipient (mill USD) 
122 137 
Avg aid to conflict, peace, and security per capita 
Avg aid to democratisation per capita 
Avg ratio of aid to conflict, peace and security 








Aid for democratisation (hypothesis 1) 
 To what extent, then, has democratisation aid been prioritised in conflict-affected states? If 
aid commitments reflect the discourse emphasising the importance of democratisation aid to 
reducing conflict and maintaining peace (H1), aid commitments to democratisation activities – both 
per capita and proportionally – in conflict-affected states should have experienced growth over time 
absolutely as well as relative to countries not affected by conflict. Tables 2 and 4 show this to be 
only partially the case. 
 As Table 2 illustrates, time has had a significant positive effect on democratisation aid flows. 
However, this is the case not only for conflict-affected states but for all aid recipients, perhaps 
mirroring the general increase in total aid volumes. The UK and Denmark, unlike Sweden and the US, 
also amplified the proportional provision of democratisation aid but again among all aid recipients 
rather than only in conflict-affected states. Comparison of the marginal rates of change in 
democratic aid commitments between conflict-affected and states not affected by conflict, 
summarised in Table 4 (based on Table 7 in the Appendix), show that on average, there has been no 
significant difference between the two groups. Only the UK increased provision of democratisation 
aid per capita more in conflict-affected states, while Denmark’s provision of democratisation aid 
proportionally declined in conflict-affected states compared to non-conflict countries. 
 
Table 2. Effects of time, conflict, and strategic interest on democratisation aid commitments 
 
The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score 
below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at p < 0.10. Regressions controlled also for region and 
time effects.  
 
DV: Democratisation aid
Sample All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff.
Time 2.32E-08 2.02E-08 0.033 0.028 1.98E-08 2.96E-08 0.005 0.005 1.73E-08 7.75E-08 0.010 0.013 9.25E-08 2.53E-07 -0.003 0.000
5.48 3.24 6.13 4.14 4.08 3.85 1.15 1.34 1.28 4.26 4.33 5.26 3.78 3.89 1.38 0.20
Conflict 3.43E-09 -0.048 -1.16E-08 -0.091 -2.62E-08 -0.029 -1.14E-06 -0.015
0.07 0.64 0.17 2.51 0.13 1.08 3.24 0.71
Post-conflict 1.80E-08 -6.69E-08 -0.104 0.019 1.33E-08 -6.47E-08 -0.126 -0.056 7.63E-08 -3.68E-07 -0.025 -0.040 -6.88E-07 -1.92E-06 -0.043 -0.057
0.41 0.83 1.27 0.24 0.16 0.66 2.84 1.25 0.28 1.50 0.77 0.98 1.58 2.28 1.35 2.56
Strategic interest 1.80E-08 1.28E-08 -0.001 0.029 8.12E-08 5.91E-08 0.029 -0.027 1.50E-07 4.32E-07 0.031 0.013 7.48E-08 -5.30E-08 -0.006 -0.007
0.61 0.31 0.00 0.80 2.11 0.83 1.11 0.89 1.07 2.18 1.36 0.51 0.37 0.08 0.43 0.39
WGI -1.68E-07 -2.93E-07 -0.017 0.360 -1.98E-07 -4.83E-07 -0.078 0.097 -2.92E-08 4.52E-07 -0.026 0.021 1.33E-07 3.22E-06 -0.120 -0.083
2.42 2.55 0.17 3.32 2.26 3.41 1.13 1.42 0.12 1.32 0.75 0.36 0.43 1.38 3.65 2.22
PPPpc (log) -2.12E-07 -2.87E-08 -0.023 0.077 -1.83E-07 -1.12E-07 0.001 0.084 -4.86E-07 -6.86E-07 0.017 -0.001 -1.06E-06 -9.04E-08 -0.089 0.079
4.38 0.34 0.38 0.97 2.93 0.90 0.01 1.90 2.73 2.50 0.63 0.04 3.82 0.28 3.29 2.45
Imports (log) 3.19E-08 -2.59E-08 0.002 -0.023 6.82E-09 2.04E-09 0.012 0.006995 1.94E-07 1.78E-07 0.016 0.022 9.79E-08 2.03E-07 -0.010 -0.015
1.81 1.22 0.10 0.88 0.41 0.06 1.35 0.42 3.00 2.05 1.96 1.47 1.08 1.45 1.17 1.13
Exports (log) 6.64E-08 -4.35E-08 -0.008 -0.054 7.92E-08 3.85E-08 0.039 0.003 6.46E-08 1.15E-08 -0.012 -0.017 5.13E-07 9.99E-07 0.019 0.002
1.80 0.83 0.23 0.88 2.74 0.71 1.52 0.09 0.62 0.07 0.84 0.70 4.52 2.62 1.75 0.10
Population (log) -1.03E-08 -1.94E-08 0.003 0.014 -2.05E-07 -2.40E-07 -0.051 -0.034 -4.13E-07 -5.31E-07 -0.021 -0.030 -5.29E-07 -2.77E-06 -0.006 0.005
0.26 0.36 0.05 0.23 4.95 3.97 1.43 0.71 3.53 2.60 1.28 1.10 3.22 3.92 0.43 0.26
Colony -2.94E-07 6.09E-09 -0.206 -0.183 -3.34E-07 -2.23E-07 0.056 0.004 -2.74E-07 -3.75E-08 -0.148 -0.075 -2.63E-06 -6.70E-06 -0.125 -0.112
3.70 0.05 1.78 1.48 3.86 1.06 0.75 0.04 0.92 0.10 3.40 1.45 5.31 4.97 3.57 3.07





Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
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 Overall, the results suggest that the donors increased the provision of democratisation aid to 
conflict-affected countries in the past two decades in absolute terms and the UK and Denmark also 
proportionally. However, this increase has not focused on conflict-affected countries and is not an 
obvious manifestation of aid securitisation, with the exception of the UK. For the UK, growth in per-
capita commitments of democratisation aid to conflict-affected states significantly exceeded 
commensurate growth in non-conflict-affected countries over the last two decades. The 
proportional allocation of UK democratisation aid to conflict-affected states also increased faster 
than to non-conflict states (although this difference is not statistically significant).10  
 
Aid to conflict, peace, and security (hypothesis 2) 
 Development policy identifies aid to conflict, peace, and security activities as the second key 
strategy to reduce conflict in the Global South and thereby strengthen donors’ own security. To 
what extent have aid commitments reflected this discourse? Again, the answer is ‘only partially’, as 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate. 
Without exception, the donors increased per-capita and proportional aid commitments to 
conflict, peace, and security activities between 1995-1997 and 2003-2015. However, this increase 
occurred not only in conflict-affected countries but among all aid recipients (Table 3). As expected, 
over the two decades examined, conflict-affected states (whether in active conflict or post-conflict) 
received on average more CPS aid than their peaceful counterparts. However, of the four donors 
only Denmark increased CPS aid provision to conflict-affected states faster than to non-conflict-
affected countries; for the UK, there was no significant change over time, and the US and Sweden 
actually reduced the proportion of CPS aid provision in conflict-affected as opposed to non-conflict-
affected recipients. Accordingly, from this perspective only Denmark has exhibited aid patterns 
indicative of aid securitisation.11 
                                                          
10 From control variables, GDP per capita and governance quality have both a consistent negative effect on the proportion of 
aid allocated to democratisation, aligning with our theoretical expectation vis-à-vis recipients’ needs. 
11 Regarding other factors affecting the dependent variable, quality of governance as measured by the WGI and GDP per capita 
have a significant negative influence on Swedish, UK, and US CPS aid commitments. 
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Table 3. Effects of time, conflict, and strategic interest on CPS aid commitments 
 
The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score 
below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at p < 0.10. Regressions controlled also for region and 
time effects.  
 
Table 4. Change over time in democratisation and CPS aid commitments to conflict-affected 
compared to non-conflict-affected states 
 
NS: no significant change 
↑: statistically significant increase in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict affected 
ones 
↓: statistically significant reduction in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict-affected 
ones 
Based on results displayed in full in Table 7 in the Appendix 
 
Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix contain the results of a robustness test where the data were 
averaged first across two-year and second across four-year periods. The results for the key variables 
are in both direction and significance very similar to those attained with three-year averaged data in 
Table 2, supporting the overall validity of our findings. 
 
The impact of donors’ strategic interest (hypotheses 3 and 4) 
DV: CPS aid
Sample All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff.
Time 5.58E-09 9.37E-09 0.011 0.017 2.55E-08 3.18E-08 0.014 0.013 4.65E-08 5.39E-08 0.025 0.021 7.44E-08 8.99E-08 0.006 0.004
3.47 4.91 3.66 2.74 8.40 6.78 6.06 4.97 10.95 6.46 10.09 5.57 7.29 4.53 4.97 4.87
Conflict 2.95E-08 0.039 7.71E-08 0.025 9.05E-08 0.034 5.94E-07 -0.002
1.59 1.15 2.68 1.14 1.39 2.15 3.47 0.20
Post-conflict 6.98E-08 3.53E-08 0.133 0.056 8.78E-08 2.70E-08 0.039 0.003 8.81E-08 1.04E-08 0.051 -0.016 3.43E-07 3.94E-07 0.047 0.036
2.75 1.71 2.93 1.24 2.22 0.52 1.55 0.10 2.38 0.10 0.51 0.32 3.45 1.56 2.03 2.00
Strategic interest 2.85E-08 -1.83E-09 0.058 0.018 3.79E-08 -3.14E-08 0.025 0.012 2.86E-07 9.34E-08 0.029 0.048 6.70E-07 6.29E-07 0.014 0.025
2.80 0.18 3.09 0.75 2.27 0.95 1.89 0.84 4.77 1.05 1.68 1.32 3.94 3.10 1.58 2.15
WGI -1.65E-09 -7.13E-10 -0.021 -0.071 -7.49E-09 -1.76E-07 -0.002 0.032 -1.08E-07 -1.76E-07 0.037 0.014 -6.11E-08 -7.78E-07 -0.039 -0.007
0.07 0.03 0.44 1.10 0.21 3.01 0.06 0.78 2.77 1.20 0.93 0.20 0.47 2.32 2.25 0.32
PPPpc (log) -1.32E-08 2.13E-09 -0.045 -0.064 -7.39E-08 -1.51E-07 -0.030 -0.050 7.99E-09 -1.21E-07 0.027 0.003 -3.86E-08 -1.42E-07 -0.034 0.008
0.87 0.15 1.36 0.84 3.22 4.20 1.07 1.66 0.52 1.65 0.02 0.08 0.88 0.97 1.68 0.64
Imports (log) -5.61E-09 -4.84E-09 -0.005 -0.005 6.45E-09 -9.89E-09 -0.012 -0.008 8.34E-08 -6.28E-08 0.013 -0.017 8.40E-08 3.46E-08 -0.005 -0.005
1.24 0.91 0.55 0.43 0.90 0.90 1.37 0.82 3.63 1.80 0.04 0.87 1.39 0.62 0.82 0.66
Exports (log) -3.52E-09 1.29E-08 -0.003 0.032 3.49E-08 7.42E-08 0.042 0.039 -1.15E-07 2.22E-07 0.019 0.024 -3.70E-09 2.24E-07 -0.010 0.004
0.35 1.13 0.13 0.46 2.63 3.75 3.04 1.75 4.03 4.31 0.24 0.85 0.04 1.96 1.38 0.65
Population (log) 8.57E-10 -6.92E-09 0.00 -0.03 -8.06E-08 -2.00E-07 -0.052 -0.055 -1.40E-07 -1.49E-07 0.018 -0.03601 -7.19E-07 -6.00E-07 0.025 -0.020
0.07 0.60 0.10 0.49 4.21 6.71 1.99 2.39 1.97 1.74 1.03 1.25 3.19 3.54 2.23 1.69
Colony 4.39E-09 -3.01E-08 0.016 -0.014 -3.06E-07 -0.045 0.003 -3.65E-07 0.044 0.023 -5.54E-07 -0.046 0.007
0.19 1.39 0.31 0.17 6.34 0.88 0.04 2.93 0.77 0.48 1.51 1.72 0.47
N 481 209 481 209 666 290 666 290 798 304 798 304 843 302 843 270
Proportion Per capita Proportion
Denmark Sweden UK US
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Denmark NS ↓ ↑ ↑
Sweden NS NS NS ↓
UK ↑ NS NS NS
US NS NS NS ↓
Time x conflict-affectedness
Democratisation aid CPS aid
17 
 
The results presented thus far do not provide robust support for the securitisation of 
development aid in line with the policy discourse. Our next step in the analysis examined whether 
within the pool of conflict-affected countries the securitisation of aid was more apparent among 
those of greater strategic interest for donors. 
 
Table 5. Change over time in the effect of strategic interest on democratisation and CPS aid 
commitments to conflict-affected countries 
  
NS: no significant change 
↑: statistically significant increase in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict affected 
ones 
↓: statistically significant reduction in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict-affected 
ones 
Based on results displayed in full in Table 8 in the Appendix 
 
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Denmark NS ↓ NS NS
Sweden NS NS NS NS
UK ↑ NS NS ↑
US ↓ NS ↓ ↓
Time x strategic interest
Democratisation aid CPS aid
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Figure 3. Selected results from the interaction between time and donors’ strategic interests in 
conflict-affected states 
Based on the results of regressions displayed in Table 8 
  
Table 5, along with results in Table 10 in the Appendix, demonstrate that the hypotheses are 
corroborated particularly for the UK, which has over time increasingly favoured conflict-affected 
countries of higher strategic importance in the allocation of both democratisation and CPS aid. This 
was also the case for the US and Denmark (regarding democratisation aid) until the last decade, 
when the importance of strategic interest in aid commitments to conflict-affected countries 
gradually declined to insignificance. In Sweden, there has been no significant relationship between 
strategic interest and democratisation and CPS aid commitments to conflict-affected states 
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Development policy discourse reflects securitisation most notably in the US and UK and least 
in Sweden. Aid commitments have to some extent mirrored these differences, particularly when 
taking into account the strategic interest of some aid-recipient countries to the donors. Only the UK 
increased the provision of democratisation aid faster in conflict-affected countries than elsewhere 
and only Denmark did so vis-à-vis CPS aid. However, when considering the recipients’ strategic 
interest, UK aid appears to reflect the securitisation of development to a greater degree than the 
other three donors (with strategic interest having a greater influence on US and Danish aid up until 
the last decade). Swedish aid commitments, in line with policy discourse, have shown little sign of 
securitisation. 
 
Is development aid securitised? 
This study has investigated the extent to which development aid has become securitised, in 
line with the policy discourse, which has increasingly emphasised the importance of investing in 
democratisation and CPS activities in order to reduce conflict and build peaceful societies in the 
Global South.12 
The results indicate that over the past two decades there has been a re-alignment of donors’ 
sector priorities across the Global South. All four donors increased over time both the per-capita and 
proportional amount of development aid committed to conflict, peace, and security activities; the 
UK and Sweden also did so with democratisation aid. The proportional increase in aid provision to 
conflict, peace, and security and to democratisation activities implies the reduction of relative aid to 
other sectors.  
However, the policy discourse holds that democratisation and CPS aid is crucial in conflict-
affected states, where restoration of peace is key to both development and to wider security. There 
is a gap, therefore, between donors’ discourse and their practice. None of the donors has provided 
more democratisation aid to conflict-affected countries than to states not affected by conflict. On its 
own this could arguably relate to issues of absorption capacity in conflict-affected states, but the 
proportional provision of democratisation aid did not grow faster in conflict-affected states than in 
non-conflict-affected states. Similarly, although conflict-affected states received cumulatively more 
conflict, peace, and security aid in the past two decades than more peaceful states, only Denmark 
augmented commitments of such aid more rapidly in conflict-affected countries. Consequently, by 
2015 only Denmark was still channelling significantly more CPS aid to conflict-affected states than to 
                                                          
12As discussed, althoughthe Swedish rationale differs from the other donors, their suggested approach to conflict-
affected states in development assistance is similar. 
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countries not affected. These results may reflect the strong and pervasive nature of the security–
development nexus as a way for donors to frame development interventions; in attempting to 
manage the perceived long-term risks associated with weak governance and poverty, donors seek to 
strengthen security sectors in states that have not (yet) experienced conflict.  
Within the group of conflict-affected and post-conflict states, some are of more strategic 
importance to the donors than others, based on the ‘level of threat’ posed. For example, our data 
suggest that for both the US and the UK, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia have held the highest 
strategic interest and Chad, Mali and Papua New Guinea the lowest. We hypothesised that the 
securitisation of development aid may be more apparent in such states. Indeed, with the exception 
of Sweden, strategic interest seems to have played a significant role in donors’ decisions regarding 
aid allocation by sector. This difference between our non-NATO donor (Sweden) and NATO donors 
(US, UK, and Denmark) may be a reflection of the distinct ways in which states seek to have global 
influence and the type of power they use to further their interests.  
The data also show some differences among the NATO donors. Until late 2000s, Denmark 
and the US were committing significantly more democratisation aid and the US also more CPS aid to 
conflict-affected countries of higher strategic importance. These positive relationships between 
recipients’ strategic importance and aid flows disappeared by about 2010, however. In contrast, 
while the UK’s democratisation and CPS aid commitments were not initially affected by the strategic 
interest of aid recipients, this changed by 2010. 
One plausible explanation for these results are changes in donor governments. The 
Conservative governments in the UK, in power since 2010, have strongly connected overseas conflict 
with domestic insecurity (e.g. DFID, 2015). This may have translated into preferential allocation of 
democratisation and CPS aid to strategically important conflict-affected states. Meanwhile, the US 
and Denmark may have ceased to give preference in the provision of democratisation and CPS aid to 
strategically more important countries under the influence of more liberal or left-leaning 
governments (in the US Democrats after 2008, in Denmark Social Democrats after 2011). 
The implication that left-leaning governments are less likely to engage in securitised aid 
disbursements chimes with previous research. Brown (2016, 2018) concluded that in Canada, the aid 
commitments of conservative governments were more aligned with national interest than those of 
liberal governments. Similarly, Fleck and Kilby (2006) found that US aid disbursements were more 
likely to reflect what they termed ‘development concerns’, as opposed to national security concerns, 
in times of Democratic Congress, while Brech and Potrafke (2014) arrived at a similar conclusion for 
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23 OECD countries’ aid flows.13 While this article has not set out to examine the influence of donor 
governments on aid-securitisation trends, our findings highlight the impact of a donor’s domestic 
politics on the role that securitisation of development plays in aid allocation (e.g. Brown, 2016) and 
indicate that at least in three of the four case-study countries, conservative governments have 
aligned aid provision with their perceived national security interests to a greater degree than liberal 
or left-leaning governments. 
 
Conclusion 
Through a detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis, this article furthers our 
understanding of the securitisation of development in a number of ways. We can conclude not only 
that aggregate aid flows broadly reflect security concerns, which is already established in the 
literature, but that securitisation has affected sector aid priorities across four key donor countries. 
However, we have also demonstrated that securitisation has had a different impact on different 
donors and indeed on different donor governments, depending on their political persuasion, and 
that a donor’s perception of recipients in terms of strategic interest also plays a role. This 
heterogeneous, rather than homogenising, impact of securitisation on aid flows should be taken into 
account in future investigations of the securitisation of development.  
More specifically, our results show that while donors have re-aligned their sector priorities 
in recipient countries in favour of democratisation and conflict, peace, and security aid, this trend 
had not focused specifically on conflict-affected states, which according to the policy discourse of 
the UK, US, and Denmark present a risk to their security. Instead, the most significant aspect of this 
changing preference may be the increase in the provision of CPS aid to countries not affected by 
conflict. The CRS project-level database suggests that security-sector reform in non-conflict 
countries in particular has received a significant funding boost in the last decade, despite concerns 
that aid allocated to the security sector can undermine democracy (Elhawary, 2010).  
Further, our findings suggest that right-leaning donor governments tend to channel more 
democracy and CPS aid to conflict-affected countries of higher strategic interest than left-leaning or 
liberal governments. While this finding aligns with broader research, it prompts further investigation 
into the interplay between domestic politics and the securitisation of development, as well as into 
the consequences of this trend for both strategically more and less conflict-affected states. Evidence 
from Iraq and Afghanistan, which have received most democratisation and CPS aid per capita from 
major donors in recent history, suggests that a sustained democratic peace does not necessarily 
                                                          
13 However, research on this topic is not unanimous – e.g. Dreher et al. (2015) found socialist governments’ aid 
provision in Germany to be at least as self-interested as conservative governments’. 
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result from significant aid investments in democratisation and CPS activities (Howard, 2015). On the 
other hand, because conflict-affected countries of low strategic importance generally receive not 
only less CPS and democratisation aid from donors but less development aid in general, their 
populations may experience even greater suffering, compounded with near invisibility in Western 
media – as the examples of Central African Republic or Yemen attest.  
In conclusion, the impact of the securitisation of development on aid commitments is 
nuanced, with a differentiated impact on aid to different states depending on their conflict status, 
their strategic interest to the donor, and the character of the donor government. In light of the 
increase in CPS aid to countries not affected by conflict, we suggest further research into both the 
reasons underlying this shift and into its effect on recipient countries. Further, in view of the possible 
connection between conservative government donors and the provision of democratisation and CPS 
aid to strategically more important conflict-affected countries, future research should examine more 
closely the donor countries’ decision-making processes regarding sector-aid allocation and explore 
the effects that such skewed aid commitments have on both more and less strategically important 
conflict-affected countries. 
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Appendix ONLINE ONLY 
 
Table 6. Summary statistics of control variables 
 
 
Table 7. The temporal change in the effect of conflict-affectedness on democratisation and CPS aid 
commitments  
 
The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score 
below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at p < 0.10. Regressions controlled also for region, 
time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Control variables
WGI -0.51 0.56 -1.98 1.12 -0.45 0.61 -1.69 1.20
GDPpc (PPP, USD) 4370 3888 247 22772 8488 7458 641 41186
Four donor exports (mill USD) 707.0 1500 2.35 9140 1220 3120 1.00 23900
Four donor imports (mill USD) 545.0 1160 0.04 6560 1610 4040 0.60 28700
Population (mill) 33.80 111.0 0.22 980.0 35.00 120.0 0.02 1300
Colony 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
EE&CA 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
ME&NA 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
SSA 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Caribbean 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
C&SA 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Asia (rest) 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
Pacific 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
No. of countries 122 137
Donor
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Time 4.95E-09 0.009 1.93E-08 0.034 4.20E-09 0.016 7.04E-09 0.005
2.21 2.21 3.42 7.18 1.42 7.61 1.16 1.50
Conflict-affected -7.80E-06 -13.596 -1.22E-05 8.575 -1.19E-05 8.113 -6.24E-05 3.208
1.07 1.26 0.70 0.60 1.53 1.40 3.35 0.29
Time x conflict-affected 3.92E-09 0.007 6.05E-09 -0.004 5.94E-09 -0.004 3.11E-08 -0.002
1.27 1.28 0.94 1.41 2.35 1.22 1.18 0.44
N
Donor
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Time 5.41E-08 0.029 -1.49E-08 0.008 8.44E-08 0.007 3.79E-08 -0.004
8.77 1.02 0.91 3.86 6.13 5.57 1.27 2.55
Conflict-affected 1.90E-05 21.912 -1.88E-04 -8.183 2.58E-05 3.914 -2.34E-04 -6.307
1.05 2.57 3.23 1.05 0.62 0.99 1.38 1.14
Time x conflict-affected -9.41E-09 -0.011 9.41E-08 0.004 -1.28E-08 -0.002 1.16E-08 0.003
1.00 2.06 2.56 0.58 0.82 0.86 0.56 1.25
N
Denmark Sweden




CPS Democratisation CPS Democratisation
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Table 8. The temporal change in the effect of donors’ strategic interests on democratisation and 
CPS aid commitments in conflict-affected countries 
 
The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score 
below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at p < 0.10. Regressions controlled also for region, 
time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.  
 




The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score 
below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at p < 0.10. Regressions controlled also for region, 
time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.  
Donor
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Time 3.36E-09 0.020 1.56E-08 0.051 7.52E-08 0.023 5.90E-08 0.021
2.22 2.47 1.37 5.07 4.56 2.98 2.09 1.66
Strategic interest -8.08E-06 -10.145 -5.19E-06 28.401 3.26E-05 7.747 2.38E-05 13.231
2.96 1.38 0.45 2.82 2.62 1.34 1.13 1.38
Time x strat. int. 4.03E-09 0.005 -7.26E-10 -0.014 -1.63E-08 -0.004 -1.41E-08 -0.007
1.96 1.38 0.12 2.59 1.68 0.96 1.34 1.45
N
Donor
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Time 4.83E-08 0.013 9.42E-09 0.023 2.06E-07 0.006 3.42E-07 -0.003
2.39 1.86 0.16 2.43 3.06 1.94 1.73 0.56
Strategic interest -5.32E-06 -6.048 -0.0000513 8.472 9.49E-05 1.156 1.15E-04 -2.055
0.34 1.07 0.92 1.12 1.74 0.37 0.70 0.43
Time x strat. int. 2.64E-09 0.003 2.58E-08 -0.004 -4.71E-08 -0.001 -1.00E-07 0.001












Sample All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff.
Time 2.51E-08 2.96E-08 0.027 0.024 2.53E-08 2.73E-08 0.032 0.025 1.46E-08 2.72E-08 0.003 0.002 1.13E-08 1.97E-08 0.001 0.000
4.60 4.26 7.98 4.70 5.48 3.76 7.42 4.36 3.38 4.70 1.13 0.68 2.46 3.00 0.27 0.03
Conflict -5.05E-08 -0.068 8.22E-09 -0.076 8.46E-09 -0.063 1.61E-08 -0.069
0.69 1.39 0.12 1.26 0.14 1.70 0.22 1.53
Post-conflict -8.81E-08 -9.91E-08 -0.102 0.009 -1.06E-07 -1.35E-07 -0.113 0.056 -2.48E-09 -7.64E-08 -0.110 -0.058 8.05E-08 1.26E-08 -0.083 -0.029
0.95 1.18 1.69 0.15 1.16 1.25 1.41 0.68 0.04 1.08 2.51 1.49 0.89 0.13 1.41 0.53
Strategic interest 2.88E-08 4.31E-08 -0.018 0.031 3.15E-08 6.51E-08 0.002 0.019 2.13E-08 -6.25E-08 -0.014 -0.039 4.10E-08 2.11E-08 -0.003 -0.006
0.71 0.89 0.69 0.93 1.06 1.24 0.07 0.51 0.61 1.27 0.70 1.45 1.09 0.33 0.11 0.19
N 595 282 595 282 370 179 370 179 890 406 890 406 489 231 489 231
DV: democratisation aid
Sample All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff.
Time 2.53E-08 7.28E-08 0.010 0.014 1.48E-08 6.04E-08 0.008 0.011 9.68E-08 2.37E-07 -0.001 0.000 8.43E-08 2.12E-07 -0.003 0.000
2.08 5.14 5.51 5.56 1.04 3.22 4.89 4.51 4.19 4.57 1.26 0.17 2.84 3.22 1.93 0.26
Conflict -1.97E-08 -0.031 9.32E-08 -0.024 8.41E-07 -0.016 1.25E-06 -0.026
0.10 1.17 0.40 0.87 2.74 0.89 2.49 1.13
Post-conflict 1.54E-07 -1.51E-07 -0.012 -0.021 9.09E-08 -3.89E-07 -0.023 -0.039 -6.69E-08 -8.62E-07 -0.034 -0.049 -7.61E-07 -2.32E-06 -0.028 -0.044
0.65 0.83 0.36 0.66 0.29 1.28 0.60 1.05 0.18 1.34 1.52 2.52 1.20 2.27 0.92 1.62
Strategic interest 7.32E-09 1.50E-07 0.019 -0.007 -3.98E-08 4.67E-08 0.024 -0.004 -2.43E-07 2.14E-07 0.000 0.011 -3.09E-07 2.42E-07 -0.008 -0.005
0.60 1.01 1.04 0.27 0.25 0.22 1.30 0.17 1.08 0.46 0.04 0.72 0.93 0.33 0.54 0.27
N 1082 433 1082 433 581 246 581 246 1140 436 1140 436 595 242 595 242
Two-year averaged data Two-year averaged data
Denmark Sweden
Per capita ProportionPer capita Proportion Per capita ProportionPer capita Proportion
Per capita Proportion Per capita Proportion
Four-year averaged data Four-year averaged data
Four-year averaged data Four-year averaged data
UK US
Two-year averaged data Two-year averaged data







Table 10. Sensitivity analysis of regressions from Table 3 
 
The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score 
below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at p < 0.10. Regressions controlled also for region, 
time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
 
Documents used for qualitative analysis listed by donor 
 
Denmark 
Danida (2003). A world of difference: The government’s vision for new priorities in Danish 
Development Assistance 2004-2008. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Danida (2004). Security, growth - development. Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
Danida (2005). Africa - development and security: The government’s priorities for Danish 
cooperation with Africa 2005-2009. Copenhagen, Denmark: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
Danida (2006). Danida’s Annual Report 2005. Copenhagen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 
Danida (2012). The right to a better life. Strategy for Denmark’s Development Cooperation. 
Retrieved from http://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=b22d25a3-6402- 4c0c-
9d26-94accf4c5490 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). Principles Governing Danish Development Assistance for 
the Fight Against the New Terrorism. Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
DV: CPS aid
Sample All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff.
Time 8.00E-09 1.63E-09 0.015 0.015 6.39E-09 7.54E-09 0.002 0.002 1.96E-08 8.50E-09 0.012 0.013 4.12E-09 8.20E-09 0.011 0.012
3.82 1.69 4.07 3.02 3.50 3.54 3.85 2.78 6.96 2.76 5.98 6.07 4.24 2.31 6.85 5.32
Conflict 1.31E-09 0.022 7.79E-09 -0.004 2.24E-08 0.013 1.98E-08 0.025
1.28 0.55 0.41 0.12 0.70 0.69 0.71 1.17
Post-conflict 1.83E-08 1.15E-08 0.051 0.014 4.48E-08 -4.29E-08 0.073 0.011 7.65E-08 3.67E-08 0.042 0.010 5.87E-08 2.24E-08 0.033 -0.004
2.23 1.37 1.67 0.25 1.85 1.50 2.06 0.65 1.78 1.17 2.08 0.42 1.80 0.52 1.77 0.13
Strategic interest 4.91E-08 2.60E-09 0.065 0.034 4.08E-08 3.05E-08 0.047 0.010 3.62E-08 2.63E-08 0.024 0.011 2.02E-08 1.23E-08 0.015 0.006
3.59 1.49 2.76 1.12 4.04 2.36 1.98 1.26 1.73 1.27 2.31 0.71 1.72 0.43 1.85 0.31
N 595 282 595 282 370 179 370 179 890 406 890 406 489 231 489 231
DV: CPS aid
Sample All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff. All Conf.-aff.
Time 5.34E-08 5.96E-08 0.023 0.020 4.45E-08 4.92E-08 0.017 0.015 6.96E-08 9.08E-08 0.005 0.004 6.58E-08 9.00E-08 0.005 0.005
11.38 7.28 11.39 7.85 9.29 5.80 9.68 6.40 7.19 4.82 6.26 5.02 6.44 4.70 5.5 4.74
Conflict 1.59E-07 0.044 2.02E-07 0.042 2.08E-07 -0.006 3.38E-07 -0.008
3.06 1.92 3.26 1.86 1.74 0.54 2.40 0.60
Post-conflict 1.41E-07 6.65E-08 0.044 0.015 1.61E-07 9.87E-08 0.058 0.043 6.07E-07 4.70E-07 0.026 0.023 2.35E-07 3.71E-10 0.022 0.019
2.11 0.70 0.47 0.53 1.99 0.84 1.95 1.33 3.81 2.07 1.88 2.27 1.23 0.00 1.68 1.36
Strategic interest 5.20E-08 2.51E-08 0.044 0.018 7.95E-08 1.04E-07 0.045 0.036 3.46E-07 4.27E-07 0.020 0.009 2.49E-07 4.93E-07 0.012 0.013
1.53 0.29 2.48 0.75 1.70 1.15 2.61 1.48 3.76 2.37 2.40 1.66 2.52 2.71 1.35 1.42
N 1082 433 1082 433 581 246 581 246 1140 436 1140 436 595 242 595 242










Two-year averaged data Two-year averaged data
Two-year averaged data Two-year averaged data
Per capita Proportion Per capita
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The Danish Government (2015). The government’s priorities for the Danish 
Development Cooperation 2018. Overview of the development cooperation budget 2015-
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